Moral evolution, a response

"I don't see how you escape from the evolution issue."

I am not, as you put it, trying to "escape from the evolution issue." In making this statement, you are attempting to foist upon me a position that I do not hold. I have not reached a conclusion about evolution, one way or the other.

However, in pressing this point, you continue to imply that anyone who believes in evolution must agree with you on the idea of evolved morality. This, as you yourself have acknowledged in previous discussions, is simply untrue. And yet you continue to make this assertion.

"If there was a break in evolution in which God suddenly put in the "morality", then this is a denial of evolution."

No. You have already acknowledged there are scientists who can, and do, believe in evolution, but reject the notion of evolved morality. Why do you persist in making claims that are in direct contradiction to your previous statements?

"There is a similar denial problem with Natural Law as a source of objective morality. It is either Natural (so applies everywhere) or it doesn't."

Is the power of flight "natural?" I'm sure you will agree with me that, yes, it is. But can you fly? I find your definition for what is "natural" (that it must "apply everywhere") to be quite peculiar. Certainly, it is at great variance with the way in which most biologists would apply the term.

"Perhaps you could give a time at which we were gifted with morality? Was it after the neanderthals? Was Homo erectus moral?"

Good questions. Honestly, Steve, I don't know. Of course, you could ask the same question of our capacity to reason, to use logic, etc. At what point in time did humans possess these abilities? Who knows? I would humbly suggest that currently, the best we can do is speculate. However, we can be sure of this much. We can say without fear of contradiction that we are indeed in possession of these faculties now. That you and I can discuss the question proves as much.

"Maybe God gave morality to Ramapithecus?"

I'm sure you're much more knowledgeable about anthropology than I. However, you may want to reconsider your placement of Ramapithecus in the family tree of homo sapiens. At the very least, there seems to be a lack of consensus among scientists where Ramapithecus is concerned:

"Ramapithecus is no longer regarded as a likely ancestor of humans." -- Wikipedia

"Although it was generally an apelike creature, Ramapithecus was considered a possible human ancestor on the basis of the reconstructed jaw and dental characteristics of fragmentary fossils. A complete jaw discovered in 1976 was clearly nonhominid, however, and Ramapithecus is now regarded by many as a member of Sivapithecus, a genus considered to be an ancestor of the orangutan." -- Encyclopedia.Com

Maggot Morality

A couple of things, Steve.

"If you don't believe animals have some form or morality, then you are implying that evolution didn't happen..."

A person does not and cannot "imply" anything simply by believing. You might infer I hold certain beliefs based on something I did or did not say. And certain beliefs/concepts may imply other beliefs/concepts (e.g. "Speech implies a speaker" or even "Your lack of belief in morality in animals implies you don't believe in evolution"), but a person doesn't imply anything just by "believing."

I made no such implication, and to the extent you made an inference to that effect, it would be incorrect. I have not reached a conclusion about evolution, one way or the other. Currently, I am considering the evidence.

But with all due respect, Steve, your statement is just wrong on its face. As you well know, and in fact, have acknowledged in our discussions here, there are many reputable scientists who believe firmly in evolution, yet totally reject the notion of "evolved morality." It is simply impertinent for you to suggest belief in evolution requires one to share your view of "evolved morality."

Finally, you state: "If there is some independent objective standard based on some kind of Natural Law, then that Law has to apply to all of Nature! How else can we know it is there?"

It "has to apply to all of Nature?" Please tell me you don't seriously mean this. Honestly, I find this to be astonishing. Are you actually suggesting that in order for you to allow for the possibility of objective morality, I would have to prove that all life forms -- maggots, amoebas, beetles, apes, fish, trees, shellfish ("all of nature") -- possess some sense of morality?

Not only do I not believe this, the absence of a moral sense in "all of nature" tends toward supporting the very point I am trying to make. That is, that it is through Natural Law that man possesses a sense of morality. For you to be willing to consider this proposition, however, you are asking me to present evidence that would disprove the very point I seek to establish.

In your view, whatever differences there are between the morality of man and animals proves that morality evolved. Paradoxically, you also view the fact that certain animals seem to demonstrate behaviors that are similar to human notions of morality as proof of evolved morality. Where man's sense of morality differs from that of animals, you count as proof of evolved morality. Where man's sense of morality is similar to that of animals, you also count as proof of evolved morality.

It seems like this "evolved morality" you're describing is a very convenient idea indeed. Apparently, there is no evidence one can offer that it cannot consume.

No, not animal "morality"

Uh...I'm not saying animals necessarily have morality, at least not in the sense that man has it. But you seem to be saying that in order for you to accept the concept of objective morality, it would require me to demonstrate that animals show a special kind of morality as well. In other words, I have to prove animals have morality in order to prove humans have it.

That is, I would have to prove something that I don't even believe in order to prove something I did believe.

Surely, I must be missing your point.

Are we at a standstill on this issue?

Well, Steve, it's seems like we're kind of spinning our wheels here.

If I point to something I believe demonstrates that morality is basically common to mankind, no matter what it is, you'll say it was "evolved." Yet you point out that male lions, when they take over a pride, kill the offspring of the previous male in charge, and that this too, somehow, proves morality (albeit lion "morality") evolved. "Evolutiondidit," you might say? :-)

Could you give me a good example of a type of morality would look like that wasn't "evolved" morality, but indicated that there was such a thing as "objective morality?"

Right and Wrong, my (perhaps) final statement

As far as I can tell, we're in general agreement about the process most people go through to arrive at ideas about what's wrong and right and morality in general. Our fundamental disagreement lies in how we view the nature of our conclusions and the implications those conclusions have.

Here's what I mean.

To the Christian -- at least to this Christian -- Natural Law embodies universal truths about how men are to live. By extrapolation, it reveals principles that are as real as Newton's Universal Law of Gravitation. And they are every bit as binding on the human race as gravity itself.

At the risk of beating a dead horse, let us go back to the question of genocide. I have asked whether genocide is morally right or morally wrong.

You stated that you "feel" genocide is, in some sense, "wrong," perhaps even "evil," and the very thought of it makes you hurt. Moreover, you have discussed it with others who confirmed your view: "And so [you] act on that, and condemn genocide."

Your condemnation, however, comes with a proviso that gives away the farm: being subject to "illusions" as we are, humans cannot be too careful about making absolute pronouncements about genocide, because at the end of the day, regardless of how palpably miserable one may feel about genocide -- or any other moral question -- it's really just an opinion.

I would submit to you that there are many questions of morality that are not subject to the vagaries of public opinion nor are they a product of it.

Have you ever considered the possibility that the reason you (and I) "feel" genocide is wrong is because it is wrong?

I'm not saying feelings can never lead you to the wrong conclusion. But neither should we assume that a conclusion is wrong just because, in the process of reaching it, we had a corresponding feeling.

Let me give you one example of what I consider an irreducible principle:

Life is sacred.

Of course, many of the laws man has invented from time immemorial, injunctions against murder, for example, are derived from this basic principle. Now, that is NOT to say that this principle exists in isolation to other principles or that there aren't ever competing principles involved when considering it. But it is a basic, fundamental principle I hold to be true.

Can I prove it? Perhaps, but perhaps not. At the very least, we can say that people act, almost universally, in a way that strongly suggests they believe that their life is sacred.

It was upon this fundamental principle that Jesus could say: "Do to others as you would have them do to you." (And yes, I'm aware that others down through the ages have articulated this same basic idea).

You mentioned the charitable contributions you had made to organizations who oppose human rights violation and torture. Were it possible for you to objectively assess your motivation, do you think it would be because A) these groups agree with your opinion that torture is probably one of the least preferable ways to deal with people, but that we cannot be sure, since we don't all agree nor can we appeal to some universal written code, or B) these groups believe torture, in some very real, fundamental way, is wrong?

I would humbly suggest to you, Steve, that there reason you feel torture is wrong is precisely because it is wrong. The fact that you feel it's wrong doesn't disprove anything.

To put it another way, ignorant tribesman "feel" something about gravity. They know about angles and velocity (think bow and arrow), even if they don't express those concepts the way we do. Heck, they may never express them at all. But there's a truth in their understanding. Gravity is a force that's self-evident to them. It acts upon them every day. Even if they've never heard of Isaac Newton.

Maybe that's a corny example. Hopefully, you get the gist of what I'm saying.

The pain of wrong-doing, cont.

I'm sorry, but I guess I'm not following you. To my way of thinking, your analogy with pain actually serves to illustrate my point.

As you say, there's probably not an objective way to measure pain. And yet somehow, even if we haven't personally experienced pain, we know it exists.

Prior to this, you said actions can't possibly be "morally right" or "morally wrong," because there's no way to measure them. Now it sounds like you're saying something entirely different:

"Is there an objective, independent standard of pain?...I think you would probably agree with me that there isn't. But you know when something hurts! When I think of genocide, it hurts even to think of it. I hear other describe a similar pain."

Aren't you contradicting yourself?

Let me ask again. If one believes there are no real, objective standards by which to judge actions -- moral actions, if you will -- upon what basis would you condemn this statement:

"We can rightly say that we believe passionately genocide is right, because of the pleasure we feel thinking about it because of our moral sense."

I'm not asking you to approve of genocide, Steve. I'm simply asking you to give me a definite answer, one way or another, to my question.

I'll be happy to give you, in my own feeble way, my answer to this and any other follow-up questions you have. But I would really, really appreciate it if you could just give me a straight answer.

Right and Wrong, a continuation

Alright, fair enough. Let's talk about the implications of your view.

In recent years, it has become popular for philosophers of different stripes to point to the Holocaust and Hitler as a way of proving or disproving a particular theory about this or that. I think this is because of the horrific singularity of the event. The worst fears of mankind were realized in the Holocaust, and personified in Hitler and his henchmen. Oddly enough, Christopher Hitchens and Dinesh D'Souza can both point to the Holocaust to prove opposing points. I assume you know the arguments of both, so I won't bother going into them at this point.

But what are the implications of your view if we apply them to the Holocaust?

If some actions or ideas are utterly devoid of any intrinsic "rightness" or "wrongness," wouldn't it follow, then, that genocide is every bit as legitimate as the notion that we should treat people with kindness? Understand, Steve, I'm NOT suggesting you approve of genocide or the Holocaust, nor am I suggesting most atheists believe this. I am simply asking about the implications of what you believe.

Have you ever heard of Corrie Ten Boom? She was a Dutch Christian Holocaust survivor who hid Jews in her home during the Holocaust. Doesn't your view, logically applied, imply that her actions and beliefs were no more "right" than those of Hitler? If they're not, please explain why they aren't.

Definition of Right and Wrong, cont.

Just so I'm clear on this, let me make sure I understand your point of view.

You believe right and wrong are the labels we give to certain actions or ideas, and our designation of a thing as "right" or "wrong" depends on 1) how those actions/ideas make us "feel" and/or 2) input from others.

Is this correct?

Right and Wrong, a digression...

I must admit, your answer caught me off guard. I didn't expect your reply to be so thoroughly naturalistic. I think you're the first person I've come across who compared the notion of happiness with the color red. Then again, we're probably not reading the same books ;-)

When you say "They [beauty, happiness] are words we use to express what we experience in our brains," it seems to me you've made a point about language, not happiness.

Of course, we use "words" to describe what we experience in life.

That thing that barks, and wags its tail, and chases after a ball when we throw it is called a "dog." I suppose we could call it a platypus or a tree or anger, but that wouldn't change the fact that dogs, do in fact, exist. When we speak of dogs, we're just appealing to what we all assume to be a shared understanding about what happens in our *brain* when we see, or otherwise perceive, that thing we call a dog.

I would also submit that the very idea of color is, itself, a concept. Color is the concept we use to describe what happens in our brain when we see things. But our ability to perceive it has nothing to do with its existence.

My question is this: How does the fact that our brains have some correspondence to our perceptions have any bearing on the existence of anything, as you put it, "as an independent concept?"

Hopefully, I'm not being too pedantic in my reply.

Right and Wrong, cont.

Your question is: "How [does] a Christian think that God, or a belief in God, provides a standard of morality (other than the idea of reward and punishment)?"

Your question is, perhaps by design, worded in such a manner as to be taken a couple of ways. "How does God give us a sense of morality?" is, of course, a much different question than "How does belief in God give us a sense of morality?" These are as far apart as, say "How does believing in evolution give us a sense of morality?" and "How does evolution give us a sense of morality?"

Do you see the difference?

As to how belief in God provides for a standard of morality, my answer is simply this: I don't think it does, nor do a great many other Christians. I would even go so far as to say that the majority of Christians (at least those I would describe as thoughtful) do not hold this view. So to the extent popular atheists like Christopher Hitchens use this notion to try to "debunk" religion in general, and the Judeo-Christian tradition in particular, this is a straw man.

For obvious reasons, I will generally refrain from quoting the Bible here. In this case, though, I think that you will find at least some common ground with the Apostle Paul.

"Whenever the Gentiles [non-Jews], who do not have the law, do by nature the things required by the law, these who do not have the law are a law to themselves. They show that the work of the law is written in their hearts, as their conscience bears witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or else defend. - Romans 2:14-15"

To put this idea in secular terms, let me quote from a New York Times book review of Moral Minds, a book written by Marc D. Hauser, Harvard Biologist:

"The moral grammar too, in Dr. Hauser’s view, is a system for generating moral behavior and not a list of specific rules. It constrains human behavior so tightly that many rules are in fact the same or very similar in every society — do as you would be done by; care for children and the weak; don’t kill; avoid adultery and incest; don’t cheat, steal or lie.

So although there is obviously disagreement about where our sense of morality comes from and how it got there (like you, Hauser believes it "evolved"), there seems to be at least some consensus on the fact that we do have it -- regardless of one's belief in God. Christians generally refer to this idea as "Natural Law," the belief that God has given mankind a shared sense of morality.

(Wikipedia gives a very good overview of Natural Law, pointing out that Aristotle is considered the "Father of Natural Law." As a practical example, the principles of Natural Law are enshrined in the U.S. Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.")

If, on the other hand, you are asking a question about process -- that is to say "How does God give us a sense of morality?" -- honestly, Steve, I do not know. It is a mystery to me.

There is much more to say on this, and points you raise that need to be addressed, but I'd like to keep these posts short. Before moving on, please let me know if I am on point here. If not, I'll try to go back and clarify my view.